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The sourcing of low-cost finance to facilitate corporate expansion on 
competitive terms is a major challenge to firms from emerging markets. 
There are additional constraints in Islamic markets as financial instruments 
must adhere to shari’ya law. This paper examines the approach taken 
by the Sudan Telecommunications Company (Sudatel) to obtain cost 
effective equity financing using secondary listings on multiple Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) stock exchanges. We compare the costs 
of equity for Sudatel stock on the Sudan and Abu Dhabi Exchanges, 
and compare these figures with those for Sudatel’s two main regional 
competitors. Furthermore, we highlight the risk-return trade-off faced 
by investors in Sudatel stock on both Exchanges, and provide evidence 
of the potential benefits to investors from the overseas listing.
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1.  Introduction
The emergence of successful transnational corporations (TNCs) from 
developing and transition economies is a relatively recent phenomenon 
(Dunning et al., 1998; Sauvant, 2005; UNCTAD, 2006). However, much of 
the literature tends to focus on TNCs from Asia (see, for example, Lau, 2003; 
Buckley et al., 2007, Filatotchev et al., 2007) Latin America (Chudnovsky 
and López, 2000) and the transition economies of Eastern Europe (Svetlicic, 
2004) and little is known about  African TNCs. This group typically face 
many barriers to foreign expansion, for example protectionism in potential 
overseas markets, a lack of firm-specific technological and managerial skills, 
and difficulties in raising reliable, low-cost finance. This paper focuses on 
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this last issue, and considers how a TNC can access sufficiently cheap 
capital to facilitate profitable overseas expansion. Financial markets 
in emerging economies are both small and illiquid, and potential 
domestic and foreign investors are discouraged by low returns and high 
volatility, resulting in a high cost of equity. Furthermore, firms based 
in Islamic economies face the additional constraint that financing must 
be compliant with shari’ya principles, which place strict conditions on 
the nature of financial instruments available to domestic companies. 
Balance sheet liabilities in the form of debt, including loans, securitized 
bonds or interest-bearing certificates, as well as certain asset provisions, 
such as fixed-term deposits or government bonds, are not available. 
These financing constraints provide additional challenges to TNCs with 
ambitious expansionist plans.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the principles 
and key features that characterize Islamic financial markets are briefly 
reviewed, and the essential differences between Islamic and Western 
markets are highlighted. Many Islamic markets operate a dualistic 
approach in trading both Western and Islamic financial products, and 
Sudan and Iran are the only countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region to adhere exclusively to shari’ya directives relating to 
corporate capital structure. This paper thus focuses on the Sudan market 
and, in particular, on the case of the Sudanese Telecommunications 
Company (Sudatel) which has been pursuing a programme of expansion 
across Africa and the Middle East. Sudatel provides an apposite case to 
consider the effects of finance constraints because its major competitors 
– the Kuwaiti firm, Zain, and the Eqyptian firm, Orascom – in the MENA 
markets have both raised capital through Western financial instruments, 
and both have much lower costs of capital. The recent history of Sudatel’s 
expansion is outlined in section 3, together with information about 
the company’s sources of finance. Section 4 highlights the important 
characteristics of the national stock exchange in Khartoum and the other 
stock exchanges in the MENA region on which Sudatel is listed.  The 
data sources and methods used to measure the cost of equity and the 
transactions costs are discussed in section 5.  The results in section 6 
show that there are benefits to raising finance on the Khartoum and Abu 
Dhabi Stock Exchanges, and that there is the potential for investors to 
diversify risk by holding a combination of Sudatel stock with others 
listed on a selection of MENA markets. Such a strategy provides a 
benefit to the firm, which may be a good model for other TNCs from 
emerging Islamic economies. The policy implications are discussed in 
section 7. The final section concludes.
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2.  Islamic financial markets
The Islamic financial system is founded on a set of principles 
(shari’ya, or shariah) that govern the economic, social, ethical and 
religious aspects of an Islamic society (Iqbal, 1997). Whereas Western 
financial systems concentrate primarily on the economic and financial 
aspects of transactions, the Islamic system embraces wider concerns 
of social justice and equality. The basic principles of the system are 
fivefold. The first is the prohibition on the payment of any fixed, pre-
determined rate of return on a financial transaction, that is, a return that 
is guaranteed regardless of the performance of the investment. This 
effectively rules out the charging of interest (riba), and the use of debt-
based financial instruments. As Iqbal (1997, 43) notes, “Islam encourages 
the earning of profits but forbids the charging of interest because profits, 
determined ex post, symbolize successful entrepreneurship and creation 
of additional wealth whereas interest, determined ex ante, is a cost that 
is accrued irrespective of the outcome of business operations and may 
not create wealth if there are business losses. Social justice demands 
that … the process of wealth accumulation and distribution be fair 
and representative of true productivity”. The second is profit-and-loss 
sharing, which requires that all suppliers of funds share the risks on any 
business venture in return for a share of the profits from the enterprise 
(Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). The third is the prohibition on speculative 
behaviour (gharar) (El-Din and El-Din,  2002; Metwally,  1984). The 
fourth is the sanctity of contracts, with contracts upheld both in spirit 
and according to the letter of the law. Partners are expected to share 
relevant information, and to contribute wholeheartedly to the success of 
the venture. The final principle is that investment in certain activities, 
for example, those concerned with gambling or alcohol is prohibited. 
These principles have given rise to a range of distinctive Islamic 
financial instruments, which include partnership (musharaka), profit-
sharing agreements (mudarabah), leasing (ijara), and cost-plus 
financing (murabaha). The first two instruments are widely used for 
long-term financing,1 whilst the latter two are used more for short-term 
1  Mudarabah contracts involve banks providing capital while the entrepreneur 
contributes effort and retains complete control over the business venture.  In the event 
of a loss, the bank earns no return and correspondingly the entrepreneur receives no 
compensation for effort. If the project is successful then the gains are equally split 
between the parties according to a pre-transaction negotiated percentage formula. The 
principle of mudarabah contracts can also be extended to individuals placing deposits 
with banks and receiving a pre-specified return from the proceeds of these deposits 
(Kuran, 1986). In musharaka contracts, the bank and the entrepreneur jointly supply 
capital as well as exercise control and supply management expertise to the project. 
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financing.2 The critical difference between these finance instruments and 
those prevalent in Western markets is that the emphasis in both their design 
and use is that of partnership and a sharing of the responsibility and risks 
immediately incurred from the management of industrial projects. As a 
consequence, the financier is implicitly expected to undertake an equal 
role alongside the entrepreneur in the management of the company, even 
if this role is largely relegated to being a sleeping partner. Musharaka 
contracts are also common in Islamic venture capital financing, where 
longer-term partnerships and the active involvement by the venture 
capitalist in the management of the firm are considered critical to success 
(Suwailem, 1998). Two further less common instruments are mugawla 
and salam financing.3 In addition, firms in Islamic markets are subject 
to zakat as well as standard taxation; zakat is explicitly mentioned as 
one the five central pillars of Islam (Kuran, 1986), and is collected to 
facilitate the equitable redistribution of income and wealth.
 Clearly, there are basic differences between Islamic financial 
markets and those in the West.  First, the ban on riba not only prohibits 
debt as a source of capital but also means it is not appropriate to use 
any of the standard models in finance theory to calculate the cost of 
Losses are in proportion to the individual capital contributions of the two parties 
while profits are negotiated freely (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). Aggarwal and Yousef 
(2000) loosely contrast mudarabah instruments to a limited partnership and musharaka 
contracts to a traditional equity stake with additional rights of control.
2 Murabaha contracts involve the bank purchasing an asset (e.g. production 
equipment) on behalf of the entrepreneur. The bank resells the asset to the entrepreneur at 
a predetermined price that covers the original cost and an added, negotiated profit margin. 
Payment is made either by a future lump-sum cash redemption, or in instalments, and full 
ownership over the tangible assets resides with the bank until all outstanding payments 
have been made. Ijara financing is commonly used in more specialist applications such 
as industrial leasing. Contracts are formed where the bank again purchases the tangible 
assets and allows the entrepreneur to use it for a fixed charge.  Ownership of the asset 
either remains with the bank or is gradually transferred to the entrepreneur in a rent-
to-own contract (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). Although the use of such instruments is 
permitted, there are concerns about whether such instruments, in providing a fixed return 
to the bank, are similar to debt contracts and are thus inconsistent with shari’ya principles. 
See Kamali (2007) for a discussion of ijara instruments and their regulation.
3 Mugawla financing involves a contract between the party undertaking a work-
related function and the owner of the project providing the capital (including materials). 
The price of the work under contract and the terms of payment must be specified at 
the outset, and payment may be made in advance, after completing the work, or in 
instalments as the work progresses. Salam financing is common in the agricultural 
sector where a contract is made between the supplier of fungible goods and the financial 
institution acting on behalf of the ultimate buyer. The key objective of this contract is to 
fix a price for a delivery of goods at a fixed future date (Mannan, 1993).
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capital.  For example, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) requires 
a risk-free rate of return, which does not exist. Second, the acquisition of 
superior information that can be used to benefit firms and investors is an 
acceptable practice in Western markets, provided that the information is 
not obtained from by insiders. Firms seek to retain confidentiality over 
certain aspects of their activities, while market analysts seek to elicit 
this information through in-depth research (Naughton and Naughton, 
2000), hoping to use this before other market participants. In contrast, 
disclosure of information is considered a moral duty in Islamic markets, to 
mitigate issues of information asymmetry, moral hazard and incomplete 
contracts (El-Din and El-Din, 2002). On one hand, this lessens the 
scope for agency conflicts and promotes greater efficiency but, on the 
other, it may discourage investments by institutional investors who rely 
on superior information in order to gain an advantage. Thus, Western 
markets typically exhibit weak-form efficiency, a condition on which the 
CAPM is based, whereas the degree of information disclosure in Islamic 
markets suggests indirect strong-form efficiency (Fama, 1970).4 
 A third difference concerns speculative activity (gharar). In 
Western markets, moderate levels of speculative activity are regarded 
as essential to maintaining market equilibrium and to allow prices to 
reflect available information, that is, weak-form efficiency (Fama, 
1970). The Western model assumes incomplete contracting, and a 
price discovery process facilitated by appropriate regulations regarding 
disclosure requirements and supported by arbitrage activity. In contrast, 
the Islamic model does not favour speculative and arbitrage activity, 
requiring a single entity to interface with the market (Mannan, 1993). 
One implication is that small shareholders do not play a significant role 
in Islamic securities markets, as their interests are likely to be short-
term gains rather than lower-return social projects. In consequence, 
most share exchanges take place between large blockholders. Finally, 
there is a difference in the nature of the equity contract itself. In the 
West, it is generally agreed that the contract provides an entitlement 
to ownership of a firm in a legal environment that enables third party 
contracting and investment. In contrast, Islamic economists prescribe 
a system, reinforced by Islamic commercial jurisprudence, based on 
risk-sharing partnerships on an individual basis (Kuran, 2004). One 
consequence is that the modern Middle Eastern business environment 
is dominated by small and family-owned firms, with larger companies 
4  However, Onour (2002) found little evidence of weak, semi-strong, or strong-
form efficiency using Khartoum Stock Exchange data.
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being either foreign TNCs, foreign joint ventures or privatized state-
owned enterprises.
 In short, an exclusive reliance on Islamic financial instruments 
is likely to raise the cost of capital above that of firms which avail 
themselves of both Western and Islamic financial instruments. The 
cost of capital will be further raised in small and illiquid markets. 
These propositions will be examined below in the context of the Sudan 
Telecommunications Company (Sudatel).
3.  The Sudan telecommunications company
The Government of Sudan adopted free trade policies and 
introduced a denationalization policy to revitalize the moribund national 
corporations in the early 1990s. One of the first sectors to be reformed 
was the telecommunications industry and, in October 1997, the shares 
of the State-owned National Wire and Wireless Corporation were listed 
on the Khartoum Stock Exchange, and the corporation was renamed 
the Sudan Telecommunications Company (Sudatel). The Government 
initially retained a majority controlling shareholding of 66.7%, and 
there were just 39 shareholders. Sudatel obtained secondary listings 
on the Bahrain5 and Abu Dhabi Stock Exchanges in November 2000 
and January 2003 respectively. These secondary listings enabled 
the Government to reduce its shareholding to 26% by 2005, with the 
remaining 74% distributed between 10,000 private shareholders.
The company initially pursued a vertical integration strategy, 
taking substantial cross-holdings in Saudi Arabia’s Arab Submarine 
Cables Company to gain access to Arabian and Gulf region markets, 
and the Electronic Banking Services Company that specialized in 
payment systems.  There were also a number of domestic Sudanese 
companies involved in satellite and mobile communications technology 
engineering (Sudatel Financial Statements, 2007). Additional services 
range from internet provision to remote high schools to the introduction 
of university distance learning programmes and other outreach activities 
in the education sector. Major projects such as the completion of an 
undersea communication cable under the Red Sea between Sudan and 
Saudi Arabia have been undertaken in combination with technical 
assistance from overseas partners such as British Telecommunications 
and the French company Alcatel (Sudatel website, 2008). The strategy, 
5  Sudatel was the first non-GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) company to obtain 
such a listing.
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combined with implicit government and legislative support, further 
reinforced the monopoly position of the company, which completely 
dominated the domestic market.
More recently, Sudatel has begun to expand overseas across the 
Sahel and Maghreb regions of Africa. Many African countries have 
recently experienced a phenomenal growth in demand for mobile and 
telecommunications technology in what were previously immature 
and unsaturated markets. Between 2007 and 2008, Africa experienced 
a 40% increase in subscriptions to mobile technology, with the 
greatest increases in the West (50%), East (48%), Central (45%) and 
Northern (41%) regions, with the Southern region (18%) rather behind 
(Africa and Middle East Telecom week, 2008). Furthermore, many of 
these telecommunications markets had been deregulated and former 
State-owned enterprises had been privatized. Sudatel expanded into 
Mauritania through a US$105 million acquisition of the controlling 
shareholding (60%) and the operating license of Chinguitel Telecom 
Company, followed by a successful bid in 2007 of US$200 million for a 
license in Senegal. Further expansion across West Africa has continued 
in 2008, raising US$1.75 billion in additional equity capital by bonus 
and rights issues in Abu Dhabi and Bahrain (Al Zawya, 2008) and the 
establishment of a holding company, Expresso Telecom, which in turn 
owns Ghana’s Kasapa Telecom (Sudatel Management Report, 2008). 
Additional bids during 2008 have been submitted for a Niger mobile 
phone company as well as telecommunications operators in Nigeria and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (Reuters, 2008). 
But Sudatel also faces significant competition in its overseas 
expansion plans, notably from Zain and Orascom – see table 1. Zain, 
formerly the Mobile Telecommunications Company of Kuwait, 
dominates many markets across Africa and the Middle East, and is 
able to source equity finance through its primary listing on the large 
and liquid Kuwait Stock Exchange. Similarly, the Orascom Corporation 
has financed its regional expansion through a combination of a primary 
equity listing on the Egyptian Stock Exchange, and a secondary listing 
on the London Stock Exchange. The ability to raise large amounts of 
equity finance at cheap rates is a critical determinant, both in terms of 
implementing expansion strategies and of accessing geographic regions 
for which operating licences are affordable and sought (Al Zawya, 
2008).
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At the end of 2007, the Sudatel balance sheet was dominated by 
equity (see Table 2). Total assets were US$2,443m, of which US$1,791m 
(73%) was financed by equity. Current liabilities were US$298m, and 
non-current liabilities US$354m. The major part of these liabilities relates 
to Islamic financial instruments, in particular 98% of the non-current 
liabilities. Much of this Islamic finance share is tied up in murabaha 
contracts, which relate to the “property, plant and equipment” in the 
balance sheet. The extension of murabaha financing for equipment was 
in the form of collateral deposits. Some of the finance for the recent 
overseas expansion was obtained through banks. The Sudanese Al 
Salam bank provided a shari’ya compliant “loan” repayable in six equal 
“profit” instalments of US$40 million commencing three years after the 
Chinguitel acquisition. Similar facilities have been sought to finance the 
expansion into the other Maghreb and West African markets. But most 
of the additional financing has come from the secondary listings.
Table 2. Sudatel’s consolidated balance sheet, end 2006 & end 2007 
(Millions of dollars)
2007 2006
ASSETS
Non-current assets 1,662 1,366
Current Assets 781 951
TOTAL ASSETS 2,443 2,317
EQUITY AND LIABILITIES
Equity 1,790 1,971
Minority interests 1 2
1,791 1,973
Non-current liabilities 354 106
of which, non-current portion of Islamic 
finance 348 103
Current liabilities 298 238
of which, zakat provision 40 44
current portion of Islamic finance 97 121
298 238
TOTAL LIABILITIES 652 344
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 2,443 2,317
Source: Abu Dhabi securities exchange website
The secondary listing in Abu Dhabi allowed Sudatel to raise 
additional capital and achieve much higher levels of liquidity for its 
stock – see table 3 – increasing the attractiveness of the firm to foreign 
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investors. The Abu Dhabi securities exchange, in line with most MENA 
securities markets, supports trading in both contemporary Western 
financial instruments as well as those that are Islamic shari’ya compliant. 
An analysis of the holdings of the stock listed in Abu Dhabi shows 
that over 70% of the shares are held by Arabs from outside the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) region. Furthermore, the free-float market 
capitalization ratio for this stock is extremely low (under 5%) indicating 
the presence of major blockholders as opposed to a more diversified 
ownership base comprising retail and institutional investors. In contrast, 
the secondary listing in Bahrain exhibits quite different characteristics 
from that of Abu Dhabi. The market capitalization of this listing is only 
a fraction of the primary listing in Khartoum and the secondary listing 
in Abu Dhabi, and the turnover ratio is consistently zero. This lack of 
trading suggests that the intention behind this listing was fundamentally 
different from that in Abu Dhabi. It is likely that the strategy behind the 
Bahrain listing was to attract high net-worth individual Arab investors 
through the provision of a possible investment exit strategy. The 
listing would provide investors with high quality information, such as 
annual reports and interim financial statements, disseminated through 
the exchange, together with a route through its own marketing and 
education campaigns that act as a ready source of buyers should longer 
term investors seek to sell their stock.
Table 3. Listed Sudatel Stock, 2003–2007
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Market Capitalization (millions of dollars)
Khartoum 589.08 946.48 1,743.01 1,610.87 1,551.18
Bahrain -- -- -- -- 131.25 130.36 130.36
Abu Dhabi 1,123.30 1,640.03 2,653.04 2,283.37 2,388.76
Traded Value (millions of dollars)
Khartoum -- -- 97.165 -- -- 126.16 131.45
Bahrain -- -- -- -- 0.00 0.00 0.00
Abu Dhabi 20.31 165.84 1,106.21 442.99 503.59
Turnover Ratio (%)
Khartoum -- -- 10.26% -- -- 7.83% 8.47%
Bahrain -- -- -- -- 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Abu Dhabi 1.81% 10.11% 41.70% 19.40% 21.08%
Source:   Compiled by the authors from the Arab Monetary Fund, Khartoum, 
Bahrain and Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange websites
4.  The MENA securities markets
The MENA securities markets are characterized by their small 
size relative to GDP and illiquidity, with trading concentrated in a small 
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number of blue-chip stocks, shown in table 4.  All are based on the 
institutional design of contemporary Western financial markets although 
many have a separate Islamic segment where shari’ya compliant 
instruments are traded. The Saudi Arabian Tadawul Stock Exchange 
is the largest and accounts for over 43% of the region’s total market 
capitalization. The Kuwait Stock Exchange ranks second and accounts 
for 16% of the region’s market capitalization and has the highest ratio of 
market size to GDP and the highest turnover. In contrast, the four North 
African markets of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia together only 
account for 12% of listed capital in the region. Markets with the lowest 
market capitalization to GDP ratios are Iraq, Tunisia, Sudan, Algeria 
and Lebanon. In these countries, business finance is dominated by their 
national banking sector. For instance, the Bourse de Tunis only provided 
5% of the funds needed by local businesses in 2007 (Bourse de Tunis, 
2008) and the Stock Exchange in Algeria attracted three listings since 
its establishment in 2003.  This exchange is not regarded locally as a 
significant capital-raising venue.
Table 4. The importance of selected MENA stock exchanges, 2005
Stock Market Established
Market 
capitalization
(millions of dollars 
at 2005 prices)
Market 
capitalization 
as percentage 
of GDP
Turnover 
ratio
(%)
Saudi Stock Market 2007 157,306.44 73.35 10.08
Kuwait Stock Exchange 1962 59,528.01 142.58 10.55
Abu Dhabi Securities Market 2000 30,362.51 37.85 0.46
Egypt (Alexandria/ Cairo) 1888/1903 27,847.48 39.26 1.81
Doha Securities Market 1997 26,702.11 130.73 1.36
Dubai Financial Market 2000 14,284.23 17.81 1.95
Bourse de Casablanca 1929 13,050.18 29.48 4.31
Amman Stock Exchange 1999 10,962.98 110.19 3.55
Bahrain Stock Exchange 1989 9,701.77 100.99 0.27
Muscat Securities Market 1988 7,246.23 33.56 1.49
Iraq Stock Exchange 2004 2,686.94 3.06 0.48
Bourse de Tunis 1969 2,439.55 9.07 1.03
Khartoum Stock Exchange 1995 746.56 3.92 1.31
Algeria Stock Exchange 2003 143.64 0.22 0.01
Beirut Stock Exchange 1920 0.99 0.01 0.60
TOTAL MENA 363,009.62
Source: Compiled by the authors from national stock exchange websites and the Arab Monetary 
Fund.  
Note: (1) Exchanges highlighted in bold are those that act as outlets for dual-listed Sudanese 
assets.  
 (2) The data on Iraq are collected direct from the exchange website.  
 (3) Although the Saudi stock market existed in an informal capacity since early 1990s, the 
Tadawul stock exchange was only established in 2007
 
 The Sudan Stock Exchange in Khartoum is the primary source 
of equity finance for domestic Sudanese firms, and it has witnessed a 
steady growth in both listings and activity since its establishment in 
October 1994 – see table 5. Listings have risen from 34 in 1995 to 48 in 
2004, and increased further to 52 in 2008. Nevertheless, the Exchange has 
a low market capitalization, both in absolute terms and as a percentage 
of GDP. A secondary equity market was established in January 1995, 
but was further split into organized and parallel markets in 1999, with 
regulation regarding disclosure requirements significantly lighter on the 
latter in order to attract a wider range of smaller firms. Additional formal 
market segments also exist for exchange traded funds and Government 
musharaka and shihama certificates.6 In addition to the formal exchange-
based markets, there is also a smaller over-the-counter market operated 
outside exchange trading hours between brokerage companies licensed 
by the Bank of Sudan, where orders are relayed via the local telephone 
network.
The Khartoum equity market is highly concentrated with Sudatel 
dominant in terms of market capitalization (63%) and trading activity 
(74%) in 2004.7 The 1997 Sudatel listing resulted in an increase in total 
market capitalization from US$32 million to US$139 million in a month. 
During 2004, the Sudatel stock was traded on all 244 working days, 
whilst the next-highest turnover ratio (11.44%) was that of Sudanese 
Free Zones & Markets, which traded for 44 days. Other stocks, such 
as Gum Arabic Company and the Sudanese Islamic Investment Bank, 
were frequently traded at 79 days and 56 days, respectively, but these 
lacked size and value. Table 5 demonstrates that the value of primary 
market issues has, with the exception of the three years between 1996 
6   Shihama certificates are a form of equity-based financial instrument, introduced 
by the Central Bank of Sudan in 1998. They are mainly used to generate finance for central 
government projects, with the government selling shares in companies that it (partially 
or completely) owns. Shihama certificates are profit-and-loss sharing agreements, but 
are redeemable on request even though the holders are theoretically permanent partners. 
The shihama certificates are issued both through periodic Bank of Sudan auctions as 
well as on the Khartoum Stock Exchange, where they collectively accounted for 25% of 
traded value in 2004. There is also considerably less concentration of trading activity, 
indicating a higher degree of liquidity than with other market segments.
7  The local market also has a highly concentrated brokerage industry with one 
broker. The Financial Investment Bank was established in 1997 through a government 
initiative to assist domestic stock market investment and accounts for 86% of the 
capitalisation of the brokerage industry. Brokerage is dominated by government control 
and lacks sufficient capitalisation for market development. This is a serious concern as 
local brokers are unable to provide underwriting for the primary market, prevent pricing 
gaps from dual-listed stocks or offer custodial services, which are essential to attracting 
foreign investors (Kenny and Moss, 1998).
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and 1998, had an annual value over US$23 million. Secondary market 
capitalization has also risen from an initial US$44 million in 1995 to 
US$2,058.42 million in 2004 and levels of secondary trading have also 
increased, although to a lesser extent (US$3.5m in 1995 to US$178.04m 
in 2004). Activity in the fledgling OTC market is often less than 10% 
of that on the formal stock exchange. Both the market capitalization 
to GDP ratio and the market capitalization to money plus quasi-money 
ratio are critical in evaluating the impact of the market faced by the local 
business community wishing to raise funds. The market capitalization 
to GDP ratio is extremely low, less than 7%, which is in line with many 
small developing African markets (Piesse and Hearn, 2005). Liquidity 
is also very low on the Khartoum Stock Exchange, although there is a 
notable increase in the turnover ratio from less than 7% prior to 2000 to 
over 14% following the introduction of government finance certificates 
in 2001 that increased domestic awareness of exchange-based investment 
products (KSE Annual Report, 2004).
The market capitalization to money plus quasi-money ratio 
confirms that the stock market is very small, and highlights the relative 
size and dominance of the banking system in the provision of corporate 
finance.  Relationship-based bank finance dramatically increased 
from US$20 million in 1998 to US$4,860 million in 2006. Murabaha 
contracts are the most common form of finance, accounting for over 
39% of funding, while musharaka contracts often account for between 
20% and 30% of funding resources. Mudarabah and salam contractual 
arrangements are considerably less common, and each generally accounts 
for up to 6% of banking sector funding. Finally, other more specialized 
forms of contractual arrangements (including ijara and mugwala 
contracts) together account for the residual 12-20% of bank-based 
funding. Financing by murabaha contracts had the biggest increase in 
absolute terms between 1998 and 2006, although the relative proportions 
provided by each contract type remained relatively constant.
5.  Data and methodology
5.1  Data
All data have been obtained through internet-based sources, 
including the Arabic and English language areas of the Khartoum Stock 
Exchange and the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) websites. Monthly 
stock prices for Sudatel’s Khartoum listing are from Khartoum via the 
AMF. Monthly stock prices, dividend and corporate action details for 
the secondary listings in Bahrain and Abu Dhabi are from the exchange 
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websites and Bloomberg. The total returns indices for the Khartoum and 
Abu Dhabi listed stocks were generated using the Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) method. Exchange rates and total returns are from Datastream 
and include the S&P Saudi Arabia, S&P Bahrain, S&P Egypt, S&P 
Oman and the MSCI World indices.
5.2  Cost of Equity Measurement
Two different methods are used to estimate the cost of equity 
for the Sudatel stock listed on the Abu Dhabi and Khartoum Stock 
Exchanges. The first method is based on the mean-variance framework 
proposed by Markowitz (1959) and the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). This paper follows 
Collins and Abrahamson (2006) where the beta measure obtained 
using linear regression is replaced by a ratio of the risk of the stock, or 
standard deviation, to the market. As in Collins and Abrahamson (2006), 
the MSCI World index denominated in Saudi Arabian Rials represents 
the market and a one-month Saudi Arabian yield is used to proxy the 
risk-free rate.  All returns series are in Saudi Rials.
 Collins and Abrahamson (2006) assume market equilibrium 
under conditions of risk (Sharpe, 1964) and take account of both options 
faced by investors and the optimal valuation of assets (Lintner, 1965). 
Following Mossin (1969) and Cheng and Grauer (1980), the simple 
model can be summarized with the cost of equity measure as:
  ( )wifi RPRMRCE += ,       (1)
where  CE  = the cost of equity;
 Rf  = the international risk-free rate, which in this 
case is the Saudi Arabian 
4-week Treasury yield;
RPw      = the world market risk premium, which is taken to be 
4.43% and is calculated over a long period from 1991 to 2008 in line 
with the estimation by Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for a similar period.
The standard deviation is a measure of risk, and incorporates both 
systematic (un-diversifiable market-related) and non-systematic risk 
(diversifiable company or industry-specific risk). Since this is a 
symmetric measure, equal weight is given to upside and downside risk 
and thus a cost of equity measure provides an upper bound measure. 
Hence, RMi in equation (1) is equal to /i wσ σ , where σi is the standard 
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deviation of the total returns of the Khartoum or the Abu Dhabi listing 
of Sudatel, and σw is the standard deviation of the MSCI World index.
 As noted above, the use of the CAPM presents a major difficulty 
in Islamic markets as  the risk-free rate of interest cannot be specified. 
Mean-variance theory assumes risk-free borrowing and lending and the 
construction of a market portfolio in returns that are in excess of the 
risk-free rate.  However, this problem may be circumvented by using 
the Saudi Arabian risk-free rate. Saudi Arabia operates a split system, 
operating in both Islamic and Western financial markets. Given the Saudi 
market dominates the MENA region and sovereign short-term debt is 
both available and traded, the Saudi Arabian rate is a good estimate of 
a regional risk-free rate. A more serious problem is that mean-variance 
theory rests upon the assumption of weak-form efficiency, which is a 
critical assumption in the CAPM.  Difficulties arise here both in the 
context of emerging markets, where illiquidity, price-rigidity and poor 
regulatory and governance standards frequently cause stock returns to 
suffer from high-order autocorrelation, and in Islamic markets that are 
characterized by strong-form efficiency, as discussed earlier.
 The second method used to estimate the cost of equity is a 
dividend capitalization model (Gordon and Shapiro, 1956), which is a 
more appropriate valuation method in an Islamic context as no use is 
made of interest rates or yields.  Here, CE is again the cost of equity, 
where:
CE = [Dividends per share (for the next year)] +  (Expected Dividends Growth Rate) , (2)Current Market Value of Stock
                The retention ratio in equation (3) and return on equity in equation 
(4) are calculated using balance sheet data,
  Plowback ratio = 1 – Payout ratio = 1 – [ Dividends per share ] ,  (3)Earnings per share
 
and Return on equity = [ Earnings per share ] , (4)Book equity per share
and the product used in equation (2).8  The assumption that the owner of 
an equity is entitled to a stream of regular cash-flow payments remains 
slightly at odds with the profit-and-loss sharing principle but this method 
represents the closest to shari’ya compliant finance law.
8  See Brealey, Myers and Allen (2008) for a detailed analysis.
16               Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 3 (December 2009)
5.3  Dual listing and the transactions costs faced 
by potential investors
The transactions costs between the Khartoum and Abu Dhabi 
listings of Sudatel stock are estimated using the difference in the 
returns between a minimum-variance optimized portfolio, which has 
no constraints on the weights given to each asset, and a portfolio with 
equal asset weights. Where the asset weights are equal, both assets are 
assumed to be fully integrated and thus have the same mean and variance 
(Sargan, 1961). If there are no transactions costs, then the expectation is 
that dual-listed stocks would be held in equal proportions. Any deviation 
from this suggests that transactions costs between the markets listing 
these stocks are greater than zero.
Table 6. Bank financing in Sudan, 1998–2006
Mode of
financing 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Murabaha 54.37% 49.12% 33.74% 39.53% 35.92% 44.64% 38.52% 43.29% 53.37%
Musharaka 21.11% 30.80% 42.88% 30.97% 27.88% 23.22% 31.99% 30.82% 20.38%
Murdaraba 5.97% 4.07% 3.51% 6.25% 4.63% 5.71% 5.74% 4.20% 5.25%
Salam 6.61% 5.02% 3.35% 4.99% 3.32% 4.80% 2.95% 2.09% 1.28%
Others* 11.94% 10.99% 16.52% 18.26% 28.26% 21.63% 20.80% 19.60% 19.72%
Total (%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total (millions 
of dollars) 20.41 285.86 393.74 559.95 787.89 1,082.83 1,706.25 3,014.43 4,861.51
Source:   Compiled by the authors from the Bank of Sudan Annual Reports (1999–2006)
Note: (1) The ‘others’ mode of financing includes the ijara and mugawla modes.
6.  Results
6.1  The cost of equity
Table 7 presents estimates of the cost of equity for Sudatel stock 
on both the Khartoum and Abu Dhabi Stock Exchanges, plus estimates 
of the cost of equity for the two rival telecommunications companies 
in the region: Zain and Orascom. The estimates are generated using the 
two methods outlined above. Both models show a decrease in the cost 
of equity from the secondary listing of the Sudatel stock on the Abu 
Dhabi exchange. The decrease in the cost of equity calculated by the 
Collins and Abrahamson (2006) model is in excess of 5%, with values 
for Khartoum and Abu Dhabi being 27.89% and 22.76% respectively. 
However, owing to the short sample and consequently relatively high 
volatility the values are less reliable than those from the Gordon and 
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Shapiro (1956) approach, which indicate considerable and persistent 
differences between the costs of equity for the two listings. The cost of 
equity in Abu Dhabi is lower by as much as 199.7 basis points in 2004, 
falling to 174.60 in 2005, and 52.60 in 2006. These results indicate that 
the listing in Abu Dhabi has enabled Sudatel to obtain a cheaper source 
of capital with which to finance its expansion into the international 
telecommunications markets.
Table 7. The cost of equity
Stock Listing Gordon and Shapiro (1956)Dividend capitalization method
Collins & 
Abrahamson 
(2006)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Orascom Egypt 16.42% 31.18% 36.25% -- -- 33.61% 20.06%
Zain (MTC) Kuwait 12.23% 10.34% -- -- 13.58% 10.46% -- --
Sudatel Khartoum 24.89% 29.15% 26.46% 55.33% 13.07% 27.89%
Sudatel Abu Dhabi 24.89% 9.18% 9.00% 50.07% 13.36% 22.76%
Note: (1) The costs of equity for 2003–2007 were estimated using the Gordon and Shapiro 
(1956) method.
 (2) The costs of equity for 2008 were estimated at May 2008 using the Collins & 
Abrahamson (2006) method, based on annualized risk premiums and risk-free rate of 
return (Saudi 4-week T-Bill yield).
 (3) The dividend capitalization method assumes constant (mean) rate of growth rate of 
dividends of 6% 
 (4) The Collins & Abrahamson (2006) measure assumes a world market risk premium 
over the Saudi risk-free rate of 4.43%.
 It is particularly instructive to compare the costs of equity 
of Sudatel with those of its two main regional competitors, Zain and 
Orascom. Zain has a primary listing on the Kuwait Stock Exchange, 
the largest MENA bourse, and has a very low cost of equity ranging 
from 12.23% in 2003 to 10.46% in 2007. The picture is quite different 
for Orascom, listed on the Egypt exchange, where the cost of equity 
has actually increased from 16.42% in 2003 to 33.61% in 2007. This 
significantly higher value explains the recent decision by the company to 
make a secondary listing of a Global Depository Receipt on the London 
Stock Exchange. The differential costs of capital may also explain, at 
least in part, the different expansion strategies followed by the three 
firms. Zain has the lowest cost of capital and has achieved a dominant 
position across Africa and the Middle East. In contrast, the expansion of 
both Orascom, which has focused primarily on North African markets, 
and Sudatel has been limited by their ability to raise equity capital at 
competitive rates (Al Zawya, 2008).
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 Other differences also impact upon the cost of equity financing. 
Both Zain and Orascom adhere to internationally accepted corporate 
governance regimes with two-tier boards (executive and non-executive 
directors), a split between the roles of the chairman and the chief 
executive officer (CEO), and the presence of an independent audit 
committee. Information disclosure is timely and in accordance with 
OECD corporate governance guidelines. This is not the case with 
Sudatel, which operates with a single board, and little to differentiate 
between directors’ roles or the positions of chairman and CEO. The 
board is composed of stakeholders, with the government, the Bank of 
Sudan and two Sudanese public investment firms accounting for seven 
of the twelve directors, following the principles implied by profit-and-
loss sharing and its influence on governance. A further two directorships 
are held by Middle Eastern affiliate firms.
6.2  Dual Listing and Transactions Costs
The Sudatel stock returns on both the Khartoum and the Abu 
Dhabi Exchanges were highly volatile over the period, with the returns 
showing standard deviations of 16.32% and 13.32% respectively – see 
table 8. Comparisons are provided with S&P market indices for other 
regional markets. The mean return for the Khartoum listing (1.82%) is 
substantially lower than that of the Abu Dhabi listing (2.29%), hence the 
former listing offers investors a poorer trade-off between risk and return 
than the latter. Neither asset compares favourably to the mean risk-return 
characteristics of the regional market indices of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Egypt and Oman, and all contrast poorly to the MSCI World index. 
This provides some indication of the degree of segmentation apparent 
between the Sudanese market, represented by Sudatel, and the MENA 
region. The returns series also exhibit high levels of autocorrelation9 
implying that these series are not weak-form efficient which is a 
significant deviation from the implicit assumption of strong-form 
efficiency and full informational revelation of prices within a fully 
shari’ya compliant market. This is a common feature of emerging 
markets due to price rigidity caused by illiquidity (Bekaert and 
Harvey, 1995).
The correlations in Table 8 between both Sudatel listed assets and 
the other regional markets are very low and often negative. However, the 
Abu Dhabi asset exhibits larger negative correlations than its Khartoum 
counterpart suggesting substantial opportunities for risk diversification. 
9   Autocorrelation results available from authors upon request
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Consequently, this is a more attractive asset for risk diversification in 
investor portfolios and increases the likelihood that Sudatel will be able 
to access additional finance.
Table 8. Risk-return tradeoffs and correlations
Stock (market)
Sudatel
(Abu 
Dhabi)
Sudatel
(Khartoum)
S&P 
Saudi 
Arabia
S&P 
Bahrain
S&P 
Egypt
S&P 
Oman
MSCI 
World
Descriptive statistics
Mean 2.29% 1.82% 2.60% 2.34% 5.12% 3.25% 1.36%
Std. Dev. 13.32% 16.32% 9.53% 4.00% 9.10% 4.99% 2.72%
Correlations
Sudatel (Abu Dhabi) 100.00% -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Sudatel (Khartoum) 34.11% 100.00% -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
S&P Saudi Arabia - 15.05% - 2.76% 100.00% -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
S&P Bahrain - 9.02% 3.42% 22.98% 100.00% -- -- -- -- -- --
S&P Egypt - 5.47% 7.45% 23.17% 38.74% 100.00% -- -- -- --
S&P Oman - 27.68% - 14.94% 39.99% 27.18% 28.82% 100.00% -- --
MSCI World 0.65% 1.70% - 2.09% - 6.15% 11.28% 4.05% 100.00%
Source: Compiled by the authors fom Datastream. Sudatel (Khartoum) are from the AMF and 
Sudatel (Abu Dhabi) are from Bloomberg.
Note: (1) All data reported in SAR end of period values
 (2) The correlations are between the total returns indices for each respective market. 
 (3) The S&P Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Oman and Bahrain indices, as well as the MSCI World 
index, are sourced from Datastream. 
 (4) The Sudatel Abu Dhabi and Khartoum series are constructed in accordance with S&P 
index methodology using data obtained from the Arab Monetary Fund.
Estimates of the costs faced by investors from holding the Sudatel 
Khartoum asset in preference to the Abu Dhabi asset are estimated in 
table 9. These estimates show that the transactions costs facing investors 
in Sudatel between the Khartoum and Abu Dhabi exchanges were both 
high and pervasive. The annualized average premium measured in 
basis points ranged from 49.51 in 2004, to 42.64 in 2005, to 88.50 in 
2006, and to value of 56.19 in 2008. These results are in line with the 
earlier findings concerning cost of equity between the two listings and 
reflect the better institutional environment in Abu Dhabi, which reduces 
informational asymmetries between the firm and its investors, as well as 
access to a wider and more diversified pool of investors. The considerable 
premium and then gradual reduction over time is partly the result of the 
improvement in standards of national accounting and auditing in Sudan, 
which had not only been misaligned with world standards but also poorly 
applied in practice, a common feature of developing economy financial 
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markets. In addition, many investors in the region have gained a greater 
understanding of the valuation and performance metrics and are able to 
reflect this information in terms of demand and prices.
Table 9. Sudatel Listings on the Khartoum and Abu Dhabi Stock 
Exchanges
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Transactions cost premium(basis points): 
Sudatel Abu Dhabi versus Khartoum 49.51 42.64 88.50 11.14 56.19
Note:   All data are in SAR end of period values, and all strategies are evaluated in Saudi Rials
These results indicate that equity investment in Sudatel is unlikely 
to follow the traditional pattern of portfolio investment elsewhere. While 
the firm has achieved a lower cost of equity by listing in Abu Dhabi and 
gained access to international investors from the MENA region the listing 
in Bahrain suggests that large individual blockholders have a particularly 
important role to play. Despite the increased levels of market regulation, 
stricter disclosure requirements and higher standards of auditing and 
accounting that have contributed to the lower cost of equity for Abu 
Dhabi listed stock compared to that in Khartoum, the company is more 
likely to seek investments from large blockholders. Equity investment 
from large individual blockholders would reduce concerns about lack 
of regulation, particularly with regard to the protection of minority 
shareholders, whose presence could be deemed to be speculative and 
thus contrary to Islamic shari’ya principles. Further, the presence of 
large blockholders and controlling groups would satisfy the profit-and-
loss sharing principle of Islamic shari’ya investment where preference 
is given to those parties involved in the active management and risk-
sharing of firms.
7.  Policy implications
A critical factor in the expansion of TNCs from emerging markets 
is the ability to access cost-effective finance to facilitate entry into 
competitive product markets. Firms that are sufficiently large and well-
capitalized are able to diversify their financing strategies through a form 
of institutional arbitrage between markets. This is especially important 
for firms originating from emerging countries in which domestic 
financial markets are often highly segmented from world capital markets, 
with associated considerably higher costs of equity. Those firms which 
are able to afford the additional listing and disclosure costs in markets 
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with stronger regulation and regulatory enforcement are able to mitigate 
the effects of information asymmetry that discourages investors and 
achieve a lower cost of equity and capital.  However, those firms that 
seek to fulfil their financing requirements in compliance with Islamic 
shari’ya directives are faced with an additional constraint concerning 
the financing location and products available. The very institutional 
design of markets that are fully compliant to Islamic shari’ya directives 
render them distinct from those markets that offer either a combination 
of Western and Islamic instruments or offer solely Western financing 
solutions. This segmentation means firms are only able to access a small 
pool of investors, with little prospect for diversification and consequently 
a higher cost of equity and capital. The high costs of equity reduce the 
profitability of potential development projects and reduces the ability of 
the firm to compete in international product markets.
 Mindful of these issues, there is considerable scope for 
policy debate amongst MENA market regulators concerning optimal 
institutional design and the benefits for indigenous firms seeking to raise 
capital from markets that are either fully shari’ya compliant or dualistic 
in their nature. Many MENA markets operate a dualistic approach in 
trading Western and Islamic financial products. This enables firms to 
benefit from accessing a wider and more cost effective pool of capital 
while enabling organizations to retain compliance with Islamic shari’ya 
financing principles.  Markets that are fully shari’ya compliant are very 
reliant on all participants having a high level of Islamic education and 
social justice in order to comply with prescriptions relating to alleviation 
of moral hazard and strong-form informational efficiency.  This way 
both borrowers and investors are able to engage in a partnership based 
on the profit-and-loss sharing principle of Islamic Finance.
8. Conclusions
The rapid overseas expansion of Sudatel into telecommunications 
markets in the Maghreb region and West Africa is particularly interesting 
as the company is a prominent example of an TNC that is not only from 
an emerging market but is also one that adheres to shari’ya compliant 
financing principles. The main drivers for this expansion have been 
the recent deregulation of the telecommunications sector across Africa 
and the Middle East, the privatization of former State-owned operators, 
and the liberalization of economies in many countries that has allowed 
foreign ownership and investment.
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The Khartoum Stock Exchange is the primary source of equity 
finance for domestic Sudanese firms, but the high costs of capital leads 
to a lack of competitiveness, particularly for firms that can list on foreign 
markets where there are stronger institutions. In contrast, the Abu Dhabi 
and Bahrain Exchanges attract a considerably higher proportion of Arab 
and foreign investors both regionally and globally. The share of foreign 
traded value in Bahrain increased from 35% in 2003 to 48% in 2007, 
although this exchange lacks the size and institutional infrastructure of 
the Abu Dhabi market.  The capitalization and turnover ratios clearly 
reflect the difference, with capitalization on the Abu Dhabi market thirty 
times that of Bahrain and turnover over ten times in 2007.
A major challenge of Sudatel’s regional expansion has been 
access to low cost capital that is shari’ya compliant. Since privatization 
in 1997, the company’s ownership has been diversified and it is listed 
on the Khartoum Stock Exchange. Additional listings in Abu Dhabi and 
Bahrain have followed, where the former was designed to attract a wider 
audience of Arab investors and the latter directed towards high net-worth 
individual investors and/or blockholders. As a result of the cross-listing 
in Abu Dhabi, Sudatel escaped from the liquidity constraints in the home 
market and thereby achieved a reduction in the cost of capital that has 
made profitable expansion overseas a reasonable prospect. 
In summary, Sudatel is likely to continue to source finance for 
international expansion from the regional financial markets in the Middle 
East as these markets offer shari’ya compliant products and cheaper 
sources of capital than are available in Sudan. However, markets that 
are completely shari’ya compliant are likely to be more segmented due 
to the global dominance of Western financial principles. In addition, 
there are also inefficiencies characteristic of emerging markets, such 
as institutional infrastructure, particularly regulation, and international 
standards of corporate governance. Consequently, Sudatel is most likely 
to fund future growth and expansion by accessing finance Islamic shari’ya 
compliant products offered by Western-style institutions, whether they 
are banking or securities companies in the MENA region markets.
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